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HEALTH COURTS AND MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
ADJUDICATION THROUGH MEDICARE:
SOME QUESTIONS
TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST*

It is difficult not to be cynical about the current malpractice reform debate.
On the side of "reform," which almost always means limiting the rights of
malpractice victims by curtailing remedies or erecting procedural barriers to
litigation, is organized medicine, a whole coterie of business and manufacturing
groups that would like also to limit their exposure to tort litigation, the public
interest advocacy groups they fund, and the Republican lawmakers whom they
generously support.' In the fight to maintain the status quo are the plaintiffs' bar,
consumer groups (some of which are funded by the plaintiffs' bar), and
Democratic lawmakers whom they also generously support. Both sides fight for
their narrow financial interest but make a lot of noise about the public's interest.
At the national level these groups have fought to a standstill, a situation that is,
incidentally, to the benefit of both Democrats and Republicans, since continued
donations are always needed to carry on the battle. At the state level, advocates of
limiting the rights of malpractice plaintiffs have achieved more victories, though
they tend to be more successful in the legislature than in state supreme courts.
Most of us who do not have a dog in this fight, that is to say, independent
researchers and organizations, agree that our current situation is far from ideal.
First, medical injury is common. Some argue whether the Institute of Medicine
(IOM) estimate of 44,000 to 98,000 deaths from medical errors per year is
accurate, 2 but most commentators agree that the number of iatrogenic deaths and

Robert L. Willett Family Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Bush's Next Target: MalpracticeLawyvers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, at
3(l) (noting the convergence of interests in the medical malpractice debate); Joseph B. Treaster & Joel
Brinkley, Behind Those Medical Malpractice Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2005, at Cl (discussing the
politics of malpractice).
2. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN:
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM I (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000). Compare Lucian L. Leape,
Institute of Medicine Medical Error Figures Are Not Exaggerated, 284 JAMA 95, 97 (2000)
(explaining three reasons why "the IOM report did not exaggerate the extent of medical injury and
death"), with Troyen A. Brennan, The Institute of Medicine Report on Medical Errors - Could It Do
Harm?, 342 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1123, 1123 (2000) ("The combination of the strikingly large numbers of
errors cited by the report and the connotations of the word 'error' create an impression that is not
warranted by the scientific work underlying the IOM report."), and Clement J. McDonald etal., Deaths
Due to Medical Errors Are Exaggeratedin Institute of Medicine Report, 284 JAMA 93, 93-94 (2000)
(arguing that conclusions drawn about the preventability of medical errors should be limited by the
failure to factor out baseline death risks in observed patients), and Andrew R. Robinson et al.,
Physician and Public Opinions on Quality of Health Care and the Problem of Medical Errors, 162
ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2186, 2189 (2002) ("Most physicians (73%) in our survey indicated that
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injuries is very high. Many of these injuries are preventable, and a significant
number are caused by negligence.3 Second, the vast majority of victims of medical
error are never compensated for their losses, and many more are not adequately
compensated. 4 Moreover, even when victims are compensated, compensation is
long delayed as cases wend their way through the court system.5 Third, the
administrative costs of the current medical malpractice system are very high.
Much of the money in the system ends up with plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers
and with malpractice insurance companies. 6 Fourth, doctors find the current
system very frustrating, 7 and some specialists in some regions of the country find
premiums untenably high. 8 Fifth, there is some evidence, though not as much as
organized medicine would have us believe, that malpractice encourages

the IOM estimate of 44,000 to 98,000 deaths per year due to medical errors was too high, and only 21%
believe that the health care system has not matched the safety record of other industries.").
3. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized
Patients - Results of the Harvard Medical PracticeStudy 1, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 373 (1991)
("Even more disturbing was the number of adverse events caused by negligence."); INST. OF MED.,
supra note 2, at 26 ("Deaths due to preventable adverse events exceed the deaths attributable to motor
vehicle accidents (43,458), breast cancer (42, 297) or AIDS (16,516).").
4. See Michael Costello, Compensating Medical Injury Victims in the United States: There Must
Be a Better Way, 83 HOsP. ToPIcs 9, 11 (2005) ("[A]n alarming number of patients who suffer harm
from medical treatment receive no compensation for their injuries."); Nancy E. Epstein, It Is Easier to
Confuse a Jury Than Convince a Judge: The Crisis in Medical Malpractice, 27 SPINE 2425, 2429
(2002) ("Optimal tort reform models would provide remuneration for truly injured patients, many of
whom, under our current system, go uncompensated."); A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between
Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence - Results of the HarvardMedical Practice
Study Ii, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 245, 249-50 (1991) (reporting that many patients clearly injured from
medical negligence do not file claims, and that approximately half of those that file claims will be
compensated).
5. See William M. Sage, Medical Malpractice Insuranceand the Emperor's Clothes, 54 DEPAUL
L. REV. 463,480 (2005).
6. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC

POLICY 187 (1985) ("For every dollar that reaches plaintiffs as compensation, roughly 66 cents is spent
by the parties on litigation"); Paul J. Barringer, A New Prescriptionfor America's Medical Liability
System, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 235, 235 (2006) ("When attomeys' fees and other administrative

costs are included, only forty-six cents of every dollar spent in tort cases in 2003 reached injured
claimants" (citing TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2003 UPDATE 7, 17 (2003))).

7. See Michelle M. Mello et al., Caring for Patients In a Malpractice Crisis: Physician
Satisfaction and Quality of Care, 23 HEALTH AFF. 42, 44, 51 (2004) (reporting findings that "suggest
that the malpractice crisis in Pennsylvania is decreasing specialist physicians' satisfaction with medical
practice in ways that may affect the quality of care").
8. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE
FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 10-14 (2003) (reporting increases in

malpractice premium rates by as high as 165% in some regions); see also David Dranove & Anne Gron,
Effects of the Malpractice Crisis on Access to and Incidence of High-Risk Procedures:Evidence From
Florida, 24 HEALTH AFF. 802, 802 (2005) (reporting that surgeons have been performing fewer
procedures in response to increased insurance premiums); Pamela Robinson et al., The Impact of
Medical Legal Risk on Obstetrician-Gynecologist Supply, 105 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1296,

1296 (2005) (reporting that "liability insurance for obstetrician-gynecologists (ob-gyns) has become
prohibitively expensive and is forcing ob-gyns to restrict or abandon their obstetrical practices.").
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dysfunctional behavior on the part of doctors, including abandoning high risk
geographic and specialty areas of practice and performing unnecessary procedures
to insulate themselves against liability. 9
Damage caps, the most frequently proposed solution to the malpractice
problem, address some of these problems, but aggravate others. They limit the
amount of the biggest judgments and probably limit the frequency of judgments
and the rapidity of the rise of malpractice premiums. 10 Caps also, however,
discriminate against those who are most seriously injured by medical malpractice,
as well as against women, who are more likely to suffer forms of non-economic
loss, such as loss of fertility." Caps alone do nothing to promote patient safety and
certainly do not expand access to justice for malpractice victims who now go
uncompensated.
The proposals posed by Mr. Barringer and Professor Sage at this conference,
"Beyond the New Medical Legislation: New Opportunities, Creative Solutions,
and Best Practices for Patient Safety, Tort Reform and Patient Compensation," are
both welcome in taking us beyond the debate on caps. 12 Both are also wise in
suggesting demonstration projects rather than immediate implementation of
revolutionary changes. 13 Both involve taking malpractice disputes away from the
civil courts and placing them with administrative tribunals. 14 But, both must be
evaluated by how they would be superior to the present situation. In what respects
do they improve patient safety, expand access to compensation, assure adequate
compensation, reduce administrative costs, rein in increases in malpractice
premiums, and reduce inefficient adaptive behavior on the part of health care
practitioners and providers? This article will address these questions.
The health courts proposal discussed by Barringer is based in the end on an
exceedingly narrow diagnosis of the basic problem with our current system. The

9. See
(2004),

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LIMITING TORT LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1, 7

available

at

http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4968/01-08-MedicalMalpractice.pdf

(reporting "mixed evidence" that malpractice premiums are affecting availability of health care).
10. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS
HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO PREMIUM RATE INCREASES 3, 5, 11, 13-14 (2003).

11. Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children,and the Elderly, 53
EMORY L.J. 1263, 1265-66 (2004); see David M. Studdert et al., Are Damage Caps Regressive? A
Study of Malpractice Jury Verdicts in California, 23 HEALTH AFF. 54, 55 (2004) (citing Thomas
Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV.

1,1-90(1995)).
12. Barringer, supra note 6, at 244-51 (discussing health courts as a solution to the medical
malpractice liability 'crisis'); William M. Sage, The Role of Medicare in Medical Malpractice Reform,
9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 217 (2006).
13. Barringer, supra note 6, at 249-50 (suggesting that there has been support from the IOM,
consumer groups, and the media to implement demonstration projects designed to test the health courts
concept).
14. Id. at 236 (describing the role of trained judges with health care expertise as the
decisionmakers in the health court system).
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fundamental problem it identifies is jury irrationality, which results in findings of
negligence when none is present, irrational inconsistencies in judgment amounts,
the absence of consistent standards of liability
unreasonably large judgments, and 15
that physicians accept as legitimate.
It is certainly the case that juries sometimes make bad decisions, just as all
decisionmakers do. I am not convinced that juries are at the root of our
malpractice problem, however. In fact, academic research tends to show that juries
reach pretty much the same conclusions experts do with respect to whether
negligence is present or not, and if anything are more willing to allow defendant
doctors to have the benefit of the doubt than are experts.'

6

Juries undoubtedly find

negligence in cases where experts would find none, but experts also find
negligence in cases where other experts find none-interrater reliability is just not
that high when complex judgments like this need to be made. 17 Also, while it is
true that doctors distrust juries, doctors distrust anyone-particularly any
layperson-who second-guesses their judgments. They have continually fought
managed care over on the issue of oversight of medical judgments and have
resisted medical discipline and hospital peer review quite successfully as well.'8
Doctors might be more willing to accept a judgment on their practice from an
expert health court, but I am doubtful.

15. Id. at 246-47 (citing inconsistencies injury decision-making as a source of physician confusion
in delivery of care); see also NANCY UDELL & DAVID B. KENDALL, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST.,
HEALTH COURTS: FAIR AND RELIABLE JUSTICE FOR INJURED PATIENTS 6 (2005) (concluding that "the
judicial system offers only irrational signals to doctors"), available at http://www.ppionline.org/
documents/healthcourts_0217.pdf.
16. See CATHERINE T. STRUVE, PEW PROJECT ON MEDICAL LIABILITY, EXPERTISE IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION: SPECIAL COURTS, SCREENING PANELS, AND OTHER OPTIONS 37-44 (2003)
(citing Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, A Comparison of FormalandInformal Dispute Resolution
in Medical Malpractice, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 777, 802 (1994) (finding a "statistically significant
relationship" between quality of care and trial outcome); Bryan A. Liang, Assessing Medical
MalpracticeJury Verdicts: A Case Study of an Anesthesiology Department, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 121, 129 (1997) (reporting that jury verdicts concurred with physician assessments in 56-58% of
cases, and that cases of non-concurrence occurred most often in cases where physician experts would
have found physician defendants liable); Frank A. Sloan et al., The Dispute Resolution Process, in
SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 153, 166-68 (Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1993) (finding physician
reviewers twice as likely to find practitioner liability than jurors)).
17. One of the more common criticisms of the Harvard Medical Practice Study, for example, is
that the level of interrater reliability among the experts who identified medical errors was low. See,
e.g., Richard E. Anderson, Harvard Study Continues to Distort Malpractice Debate, THE DOCTORS
COMPANY (2005), http://www.thedoctors.com/reference/l1996-2002/distortquality.asp (noting that two
sets of reviewers failed to identify the same group of adverse events, although they did find the same
incidence of adverse and negligent events); Tom Baker, Reconsidering the Harvard Medical Practice
Study Conclusions about the Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33 LAW, MED. & ETHICS 501,
504 (2005) (noting strong disagreement between study researchers as to individual incidence of
negligence).
18. See Peter D. Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care? A Policy Whodunit, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
365, 370-71 (2003) (reviewing evidence of physician opposition to managed care).
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The important question, however, is how the health court proposal fares in
terms of improving on our current system. The proposal purports to expand the
number of compensated claims, which would be an improvement. I am not
confident, however, that it would in fact do this. Both proposals do provide for
liberalizing the standard of compensability from negligence to a preventable or
avoidable medical mistake standard.' 9 This should expand compensation awards,
though experience from other countries shows that application of standards like
20
this is difficult and leaves open serious and controversial causation questions.
The key factors with respect to access expansion, however, would be the nature
and role of the local review boards created by the proposal to screen out
unmeritorious or trivial claims. Who would constitute these boards, who would
appoint them, what standards would they apply, and what evidence would they
consider? These boards are to make their decisions based on reviewing medical
charts and interviewing "patients, doctors, and nurses." Would they also consult
independent experts? Would they simply accept the story of the health care
providers as to what happened, or would they conduct thorough investigations?
They are to be located "in or near hospitals." What would guarantee their
independence? Further, more needs to be said in the health courts proposal about
the obligation of health care providers to notify injured persons of the fact that a
medical error has occurred. This requirement was missing in earlier proposals and
needs to be fleshed out. If medical mistakes continue to be concealed, many of
their victims will go without compensation.
The proposal also claims to increase the rationality of compensation by
scheduling non-economic loss in lieu of leaving damages to the discretion of the
jury. 2' This sounds like a good idea, but everything will depend on how schedules
are set, and who sets them. This could turn out to be simply damage caps at a
micro rather than macro level. If the process of setting and updating these caps
becomes a political process and is captured by health care providers, it could be
more effective in limiting compensation for malpractice victims than MICRA caps
have been. 22 If, on the other hand, schedules are set through a truly fair and
independent process, they could improve the rationality, perhaps even the level, of

19. Barringer, supra note 6, at 244; Sage, supra note 12, at 227-30.
20. See generally TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, READINGS

IN COMPARATIVE

HEALTH LAW &

BIOETHICS 131-45 (2001) (describing struggles in both New Zealand and Sweden with their no-fault

compensation systems).
21. See Barringer, supra note 6, at 245-48.
22. MICRA is an acronym for the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, a damage cap statute
that has been enacted by California. Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, ch.1, 1975 Cal. Stat.
3949 (codified as CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(6) (West 2006)). California's MICRA cap has been
criticized because, although premiums for malpractice insurance have gone up, the MICRA cap on how
much a plaintiff can recover has not changed since 1975. Martin Ramey, Comment, Putting the Cart
Before the Horse: The Need to Re-Examine Damage Caps in California's Elder Abuse Act, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 599, 628-29 (2002).
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compensation. It is also important to know what all is included in noneconomic
loss, as far more than pain and suffering is at stake here.
The health courts proposal asserts that it would cut the administrative costs of
litigation and speed it up. 23 Reliance on independent experts could cut costs, as
could the elimination of juries. Early investigation of claims by screening panels
could cut discovery costs. On the other hand, the proposal still relies on an
adversarial system, and now adds another layer to the process in local screening
panels. The proposal does eliminate contingent fees. 24 This should reduce the
transactions costs of claims and get more money to malpractice victims. It is not
clear, however, what incentive a lawyer would have to bring a claim for a victim
whose case is going to be difficult to prove if there is only risk and no opportunity.
Up-front payment of fees is never going to cover the costs of litigation in these
cases, and attorneys fees can only be awarded to those who win.
It is also not clear that the health courts proposal would improve quality or
protect safety. The hope is, apparently, that a process with greater professional
integrity and legitimacy could be a more open process that would set clearer
ground rules for defining adequate performance than does the current system, as
well as greater exposure to adverse publicity and to disciplinary action for those
who do not perform adequately. Perhaps, though I doubt that many health care
providers are going to learn much from the avoidable events list that they do not
already know. Most providers, for example, already know that it is inappropriate
to leave foreign objects in surgical sites.
Health court advocates also join the chorus claiming that doctors currently
hide their mistakes because they fear malpractice liability and that health courts
would make doctors more forthcoming in admitting and dealing with their errors."
I believe that the notion that doctors would freely discuss and address their
mistakes if malpractice liability would just go away is nonsense. 26 Doctors did not
freely discuss their faults before malpractice became an issue and do not today in
countries where it is not a problem.27 Law professors seldom get sued for making
mistakes, yet they do not sit around the faculty lounge talking about how badly
they screwed up in class. No one, under any circumstances, likes to admit to
making mistakes, least of all physicians. I cannot imagine that they would be more

23. Barringer, supra note 6, at 239, 247-48.
24. See id. at 251-53 (noting that juries would be replaced with review boards in clear cases and
health court judges relying on court appointed experts in unclear cases).
25. Id. at 245, 248-49; see also David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care
Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL
L. REV. 893, 909-14 (2005) (contesting the widely accepted belief that "malpractice liability impedes
efforts to improve patient safety and health care quality by restricting the free flow of information about
mistakes.").
26. Hyman & Silver, supranote 25, at 909-14.
27. See id. at 928-30 (discussing the relevance of underreporting in the United Kingdom, a country
in which malpractice suits are "relatively rare").
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likely to admit their mistakes if they faced being dragged in front of a health court
rather than a jury. I am, in the end, not convinced that health courts would expand
access to justice, reduce administrative costs, or improve patient safety. I am most
of all, however, troubled with the question of whether they could truly be
impartial. At the heart of the proposal is a call for "judges with expertise in health
care.
I am not sure, as I wrote earlier, how useful this expertise would be.
Given the highly specialized nature of modem medicine, general "health care
expertise" may not help in understanding what went wrong in particular cases.
But if "judges with health care expertise" means doctors, I would be truly troubled
by the proposal. I have known many doctors in my life and met few whom I
would trust to judge a malpractice claim evenhandedly. We also need to know
more about how "independent expert witnesses" would be chosen to avoid
partiality.29 We all know how easily administrative agencies can be captured.3 °
The current situation has many faults, but it does have the virtue of relatively
unbiased decisionmakers. I am not confident that this proposal preserves that
virtue.
Professor Sage's proposal to use Medicare's administrative structure to
adjudicate malpractice disputes avoids some of these problems. 3' First, it clearly
attends to quality improvement and patient safety. Though it is not wholly clear on
how malpractice adjudications under the program would contribute to patient
safety, Professor Sage correctly notes that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) is seriously committed to using the Medicare program to improve
quality and protect patients, and various components of this strategy, such as the
Quality Improvement Organization (QIO) program, the Quality Assessment and
Performance Improvement (QAPI) initiative, and a number of pay for performance
projects, are in place or soon will be. 32 One can easily imagine a number of ways
in which medical error evaluations could be linked to these programs.
The Medicare proposal also seems more likely to expand access to
compensation for victims of medical error who now do not receive compensation.

28. See Barringer, supra note 6, at 245.
29. Id.at 246 (describing how health courts would consult "neutral medical experts" to determine
the standard of care); STRUVE, supra note 16, at 73-75.
30. See Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1111, 1148-53 (1990) (discussing the politicization of specialized courts when reviewing
specific agencies); Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive until 1984? An
Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 783-84

(1983) (noting that specialized courts are more likely to be "controlled by the political branches of
government"). See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. &

MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971) (providing an overview of economic regulatory theory).
31. See Sage, supra note 12, at 226-31.
32. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., QUALITY INITIATIVES: GENERAL
INFORMATION,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/QualitylnitiativesGenlnfo/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2006)
(emphasizing the importance of quality initiatives in assuring accountability and public disclosure).
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As Professor Sage points out, Medicare beneficiaries and the elderly in particular
often now do not receive compensation when they suffer injury from medical
error. 33 The proposal would attempt to ensure that these persons are told when
they have been the victims of medical error. 34 It would also help overcome one of
the primary barriers to compensations now faced by the elderly: the
unattractiveness of their cases to lawyers paid strictly on a contingent fee basis
because of small recoveries. The availability of an administrative tribunal might
make claiming less costly and thus more frequent. Finally, the charge to the
Medicare beneficiary ombudsperson to assist beneficiaries in claiming could also
increase the frequency of claiming and compensation. On the other hand, the
proposal also contemplates a minimum threshold of injury before a claim could be
brought, and where this threshold was set would go far toward determining the
extent to which the proposal actually expanded access to justice for Medicare
beneficiaries.
I agree with Professor Sage that Medicare could probably carry out at least a
voluntary experiment under its demonstration authority, and that Congress could
probably preempt common law state tort remedies for Medicare beneficiaries
35
against Medicare providers under the spending power if it chose to do so.
Though the Supreme Court has been rather ambivalent about the scope of the
power of Congress under the Commerce Clause, it has until now been tolerant of
36
expansive interpretations of the Spending Clause.
I do have real concerns about the proposal, however. First, I am not sure how
successful Medicare would be in imposing this program on providers, especially
physicians. The checkered history of the former Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare's (DHEW's) attempts to enforce the civil rights laws through the
Medicare program are here instructive. DHEW was successful in requiring
hospitals to integrate as a condition of their participation in the nascent Medicare
program. 37
In the mid-1960s it faced down considerable resistance from
segregated hospitals and ultimately almost all integrated. 38 It did not attempt,
however, to desegregate nursing homes, where greater resistance was expected.3 9
It did not even try to require doctors to comply with the civil rights laws. As

33. Sage, supranote 12, at 221-25.
34. Id. at 220.
35. See id. at 233.
36. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987) (affirming the broad powers of
Congress under the Spending Clause).
37. See DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED: RACE AND HEALING A NATION 125-26
(1999) (providing an overview of Title VI compliance enforcement through DHEW); Sidney D.
Watson, Race, Ethnicity and Quality of Care: Inequalities and Incentives, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 203,
213-16 (2001) (documenting the use of the Medicare system to desegregate medical care).
38. See SMITH, supra note 37, at 137-41 (documenting federal persistence in enforcing integration
under Title VI).
39. Id. at 159-61.
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recently as 2002, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the
successor to DHEW, again reiterated its position that physicians who are receiving
only Medicare Part B payments are not bound by Title VI. 40 HHS still regards Part
B as an indemnity insurance plan, through which beneficiaries pay doctors who are
not government contractors.4 '
I believe that the position of HHS on civil rights law compliance enforcement
reflects a realistic appraisal of how much leverage it has with providers and
professionals. Hospitals are so financially dependent on the Medicare program
that CMS can do almost anything to them without driving them away, including,
perhaps, requiring them to participate in a demonstration project dealing with
medical error. Physicians, on the other hand, or at least physicians not located in a
few Medicare-dependent specialties like opthamology, will leave Medicare if
pushed too hard, as recent annual debates on Resource-Based Relative Value Scale
(RBRVS) increases have made clear.42 This program would have to be made very
attractive to doctors to get them to participate voluntarily.
A second concern is whether the Medicare claims review and appeals system
can really be adapted to hear medical negligence cases. The Medicare
administrative process is adapted to hear a particular kind of case-coverage
determinations. This is what Medicare contractors, Qualified Independent
Contractors (QlCs) (which provide reconsiderations for Part A and B
determinations), Medicare Advantage plans, and Maximus CHDR (which reviews
Medicare Advantage appeals) do. These can be complex cases, but they are
usually quite straightforward compared to medical negligence cases. They are
usually guided by thousands of local coverage determinations and dozens of
43
national coverage determinations.
Administrative law judges (ALJs) play an
increasingly routinized role in this process. Under recent regulations, virtually all
ALJ hearings will be conducted by video conferencing.
They are also moving
increasingly toward exercising strictly a review, as opposed to a fact-finding,
function. The Medicare Modernization Act prohibits ALJs from hearing new

40. Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against
National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 68 Fed. Reg. 47311,
47313 (Aug. 8, 2003).
41. Id. at 47313 n.4 (confirming that Title VI regulations do not apply to "[a]ny federal financial
assistance by way of insurance or guaranty contracts...").
42. See AM. MED. AsS'N, AMA MEMBER CONNECT SURVEY: MEDICARE PAYMENT CUTS WILL

HURT ACCESS TO CARE (Apr. 5, 2005), http://ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/14925.html (reporting
that 38% of physicians will decrease the number of new Medicare patients they accept as a result of the
payment cut).
43. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Medicare Coverage Determination Process in the United
States, in HEALTH CARE COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE

STUDY

212-19 (Timothy Stoltzfus Jost ed., 2004) (describing Medicare coverage determinations and the
process through which they are made).
44. See 42 C.F.R. § 405.1020(b) (2005).
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evidence in cases brought by providers or suppliers unless good cause is shown.45
Moreover, as Professor Sage's article acknowledges, by the summer of 2005, HHS
was forming its own AL corps, in place of using Social Security ALJs as it has in
the past.46 Though Professor Sage's essay is correct that Social Security ALJs
have a great deal of experience in evaluating disability, which could be applied
toward assessing causation and damages, my impression is that few SSA ALJs are
transferring to HHS and that HHS is by and large bringing in a new group of ALJs
with very mixed experiences.47
Most importantly, the Medicare appeals process is currently in crisis,
incorporating new procedures and actors (including the QICs, who just began
contracting with the program this year, and the new HHS ALJs), subject to very
strict time limits for throughput imposed by BIPA and the MMA, and
overwhelmed by impossible numbers of appeals.48 Imposing on this system a new,
very different, and very complicated task is difficult to imagine and would meet
stiff resistance.
A third concern is how liability would be assessed and damages imposed
under the program. The proposal suggests again, like the health courts proposal, a
no-fault system based on avoidable events and reliance on schedules for
determining damages. 49 The definition of avoidable events and the crafting of the
damage schedules would unavoidably become the task of some administrative
entity, presumably CMS (though an argument could be made that these decisions
would better lie somewhere else within HHS, such as with the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality or the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention). CMS is already burdened beyond capacity with rulemaking
responsibilities, including annual revisions of a number of prospective payment
system regulations that regularly run to hundreds of pages and dozens of new

45. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2402 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(3) (West 2005)).
46. Sage, supra note 12, at 231.
47. See Letter from Leslie G. Aronovitz, Dir., Health Care Program of the U.S. Gov't
Accountability Office, to Hon. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman, and Hon. Max Baucus, Ranking
Minority Member, Committee on Finance (June 30, 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d05703r.pdf (noting the "extremely ambitious" timetable of HHS in hiring and training
sufficient numbers of ALJs); Kenneth E. Stewart, Medicare Appeals Before Administrative Law Judges
(Feb.2005).
48. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICARE: INCOMPLETE PLAN TO TRANSFER
APPEALS WORKLOAD FROM SSA TO HHS THREATENS SERVICE TO APPELLANTS 4, 10, 14, 19-20
(2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0545.pdf (reiterating concerns over plan to transfer
appeals); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICARE APPEALS: DISPARITY BETWEEN
REQUIREMENTS AND RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES' CAPABILITIES 1-3 (2003), available at http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/d03841.pdf (criticizing appeals bodies for failing to conform with timeliness
requirements).

49. Sage, supra note 12, at 229-32.
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rulemaking requirements imposed by the MMA. 50 In all likelihood, CMS would
have to resort to informal processes for coming up with these standards, as it does
not with coverage determinations. This process, however, is highly subject to
interest group manipulation. It would be likely to prove intensely political, and
quite messy.
Finally, I would raise an overall question for both proposals. Both basically
propose to adapt the model that we have used in this country for almost a century
for workers' compensation to medical malpractice. It would seem to me, therefore,
that we should take a long hard look at workers' compensation to see how that
program has worked out before we proceed down this path with malpractice
adjudication. Has it broadened access to compensation, provided more rational
compensation, improved safety, simplified administration, and brought down
costs? Are both workers and employers satisfied with the system? Is it a just
system? There must be a large volume of literature evaluating workers'
compensation. I am not familiar with it, and did not presume to familiarize myself
with it for the purposes of this brief article. But it seems to me that an essential
step in any argument for moving from our current malpractice system to an
administrative adjudication model would be to come to terms with this literature.
I, for one, would be very interested in finding out what this investigation would
yield.

50. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Governing Medicare, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 39, 88-92 (1999) (noting
the "visible policy-making output" of Medicare regulations, illustrated by the fact that the 1997 Code of
Federal Regulations contained two thick volumes of Medicare regulations).

